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I. INTRODUCTION
Nowhere is the American ideal of "We the People" democracy
more realized than at the level of local government. Government in the
*Professor of Law, Barry University Dwayne 0. Andreas School of Law;
LL.M. 1995, Yale University; J.D. 1991, University of Florida; M.S.S.A. 1976, Case
Western Reserve University; B.A. 1974, University of Wisconsin, Madison. The
genesis of this article stems from an invitation I received from the Martin County,
Florida, School Board to discuss First Amendment principles as they relate to public
comment sessions. Much appreciation to the Martin County School Board and its
attorney, Doug Griffin, for the opportunity to speak on these issues.
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sunshine2 and open access laws3 mandate that local school boards, city
councils, and county commissions hold public meetings, often requiring
a public comment session.4 Operating government business in the public
eye, with the opportunity for citizen input, provides direct access to
government decision-makers. Public access allows all citizens, regardless
of their political clout, to have the ear of those decision-makers who
often have the most direct impact on citizens' everyday lives. Whether
the controversy involves employment of a high school coach, a zoning
variance or the closing of a community center, those most affected can
directly express to local officials their support of, or opposition to, the
cause at issue.
There are two aspects of open government; one is transparency,
the other is citizen input. This paper focuses on the latter, and
specifically on the rules of decorum that apply to public comment
sessions at public meetings. Fortunately, violence at government
meetings, like the recent shooting at a school board meeting, is rare.
However, when angry citizens or disgruntled employees vent their
** J.D. 2011, Barry University School of Law; B.A. 2006, Auburn University.
1. U.S. CONsT. pmbl.
2. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 286.001 (2009); Mo. REV. STAT. § 610.010 (2006);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-27-1 (2004); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 16-4-201 (2011).
3. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-431.01(G) (2011); CAL. Gov'T CODE
§I§ 1125.7(a), 54954.3(a) (2011); FLA. STAT. § 286.0115(2)(b) (2009); flAw. REV.
STAT. § 92-3 (1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42:14 (2010); NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-
1412(2) (2008); 65 PA. CONS. STAT. § 710.1(a) (2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1-
312(h) (2010); Wis. STAT. § 19.84 (2011).
4. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 11-44-127, 16-8-3 (2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§
1 13A- 1l0, 143-14 (2009).
5. Florida School Board Shooting: Gunman Opens Fire During Meeting,
HUFFINGTON PosT (Dec. 14, 2010, 11:49 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010
/12/14/florida-school-board-shoo n 796689.html.
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frustrations in public meetings, government business can be impeded6
and reputational harm can result.'
Some recent examples of public comments that resulted in the
ejection or arrest of citizens illustrate the intricate balance between an
individual's right to speak at a public meeting, and the right of public
bodies to hold their meetings without undue disruption.8 In Ohio, after
years of listening to the shouts of Norman Edwards, the Cleveland-
Cuyahoga County Port Authority told Edwards that he is no longer
allowed to comment at public meetings.9 Edwards is known for accusing
public bodies and union officials of "keeping black people from working
on publicly funded projects[,]" once calling a board member a racist. 0 In
Louisiana, the Orleans Parish School Board meetings have become what
some call a mockery. When board President Gail Glapion told a
resident to "[b]e brief' the resident responded, "'OK. The end. Period,'
. . . prompting hoots from the audience." 2 Another example is when
Lloyd Lazard criticized a trip to Washington that Glapion would be
taking to attend the Schools' Spring Legislative Policy Conference,
saying that the "trip [was] a waste of money" and the only purpose was
for Glapion to continue her "social climbing and elbow rubbing" with
local politicians "who all have an office on Magazine Street."13 When
Glapion responded to Lazard's comments with a "Thank you, Mr.
Lazard, for your opinion," he retorted, "You're not welcome, Mizz
6. See White v. City of Norwalk, 900 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that
speakers at public meetings can be silenced if they are "disruptive"). "A speaker may
disrupt a Council meeting by speaking too long, by being unduly repetitiuous, or by
extending discussion of irrelevancies." Id. at 1426. "The meeting is disrupted
because the Council is prevented from accomplishing its business in a reasonably
efficient manner." Id.
7. See Thoraton v. City of Kirkwood, No. 4:07CV79 CDP, 2008 WL 239575,
at *5 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 28, 2008) (rejecting First Amendment claims of a man removed
from a City Council meeting for "repetitive, personal, virulent attacks" against
council members).
8. See White, 900 F.2d 1421.
9. Tom Breckenridge, Port Authority Gives Vocal Contractor a 'Timeout,'
CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, June 26, 2008 at Cl.
10. Id.
11. Lynne Jensen, School Board Meetings Draw the Civic and the Silly, NEW




Glapion.',14 Such exchanges not only frustrate the Board, but also annoy
other citizens, like one elderly woman at the meeting who said, "This is
why I didn't want to come to no meeting."' 5
In an attempt to maintain civility and the ability to conduct
business, government entities often limit the tenor and subject matter of
public comment.'6 However, how, what, and who can comment at public
meetings is not clear from the existing case law. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that discussions on public officials and government
business should be open and robust, and are fully protected by the First
Amendment, even if not always in perfect taste.17 In creating parameters
that govern public comment, local governing boards must be cautious not
to trample on the First Amendment rights of those wishing to speak. This
paper will discuss the factors that government entities should consider in
fashioning rules of decorum for public comment that comply with First
Amendment dictates and protect the operation of government business
and the reputational interests of government employees.
Americans have always been imbued with the local "spirit of
liberty" 8 and have been powerful participants in local government. A
discussion of rules applicable to public comment sessions begins and
ends with the First Amendment.' 9 However, this paper will discuss the
key constitutional principles after reviewing some of the cases involving
citizens' claims that their voices were silenced at public meetings and
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See IND. CODE § 5-14-1.5-3(a) (2007) (maintaining that the public is only
allowed to "observe and record" public meetings); see also ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §
38-431.01(H) (2011); CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 11125.7(b), 54954.3(b) (2010); FLA.
STAT. § 286.0115(3) (2009); H-Aw. REV. STAT. § 92-3 (2007); MD. CODE ANN.,
STATE Gov'T. § 10-507(b) (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1412(2) (2008); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 1 § 312(h) (2010); W. VA. CODE § 6-9A-3 (2010); Wis. STAT. § 227-
18(3)(c) (2009).
17. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 47 (1988); Jones v.
State Bd. of Ed. for Tenn., 397 U.S. 31, 33 (1970); N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 269 (1964) (citing Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941)).
18. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 55-56 (J.P. Mayer &
Max Lerner, eds., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. 1966) (1835) (describing America,
de Tocqueville wrote, "the strength of free peoples resides in the local community
... [w]ithout local institutions, a nation may give itself a free government, but it has
not got the spirit of liberty").
19. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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surveying some of the rules of decorum that states and local governments
have adopted. Much of the confusion in finding the appropriate balance
between "maximiz[ing] citizen participation" and "ensur[ing] the
efficient conduct of the people's business" 20 lies in a misapplication of
forum analysis and the lack of training on the part of officials who have
the responsibility of maintaining order at public meetings.
Therefore, before discussing the First Amendment, Part II of this
paper will review some of the situations in which citizens' input at public
meetings impedes government business or offends the sensibilities of
others attending the meetings.2 1 Part III will survey the many different
22
types of state and local laws that govern public session comments.
While legislators and courts are not always in agreement on the scope
and latitude of freedom afforded citizen speech, 23 it is well recognized
that citizens have a First Amendment right in speaking on public issues
24
to those who govern, particularly at the local level. Courts have
inconsistently viewed public comment sessions through the lens of a
public forum analysis. Furthermore, public employees, speaking in their
official capacity, do not receive the same First Amendment protection as
25
private citizens. With an eye toward unraveling the confusion in the
existing case law, Part IV will discuss the First Amendment principles
which local government entities must consider when fashioning rules
applicable to public comment sessions.26 Part V will suggest guidelines
20. Steinburg v. Chesterfield Cnty. Planning Comm'n, 527 F.3d 377, 387 (4th
Cir. 2008).
21. See infra Part II.
22. See infra Part Ill.
23. See infra Parts II and III.
24. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966) (stating, "[A] major
purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental
affairs. This of course includes discussions of candidates, structures and forms of
government, the manner in which government is operated or should be operated, and
all such matters relating to political processes."); Piscottano v. Town of Somers, 396
F. Supp. 2d 187, 200 (D. Conn., 2005) (citation omitted) ("The First Amendment's
protection of free speech . . . extends to a broad range of speech and expressive
conduct. Speech on public issues and political matters lies at the heart of protected
speech.") (internal citations omitted).
25. See Garcetti v. Cebballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006) (stating "[w]hen a
citizen enters government service, the citizen by necessity must accept certain
limitations on his or her freedom.").
26. See infra Part IV.
61
62 FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10
for local governments to follow when adopting and implementing rules
27
of decorum for public comment sessions at local government meetings.
In conclusion, Part VI will suggest that incivility is inevitable in public
28
discourse and rules of decorum are, at best, aspirational.
II. CITIZENS' SPEECH CLASHES WITH GOVERNMENT BUSINESS AND
SENSIBILITIES
Hundreds of thousands of viewers witnessed a man pulling a gun
at a Florida school board meeting as the incident, captured on video,
appeared on major news networks and went viral on YouTube.29 Angry
at association rules mandating the use of a contracted landscaper, a
member of a gated community took a gun to a county meeting and killed
two commissioners.30 In Missouri, another disgruntled citizen, yelling
"[s]hoot the Mayor," burst into a city council meeting and shot two
police officers and three city officials before being fatally wounded."
These and other headline-grabbing news stories are fortunately isolated
incidents of citizens-gone-mad. No amount of rules adopted to govern
citizen participation in government meetings will deter those individuals,
who for reasons of illness or other infirmities, are committed to such acts
of violence. In fact, the only antidote for such individuals is strong
security measures.
However, it is the fear of disruption and the risk of violence that
often fuel the promulgation of rules and government actions that limit or
preclude citizen participation in public meetings. 32 Where government
meetings do include public comment sessions, rules of decorum are
27. See infra Part V.
28. See infra Part VI.
29. Florida School Board Shooting, supra note 5; Florida School Board
Shooting - Full WMBB Video - December 14, 2010, YouTUBE (Dec. 14, 2010)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-wQjQOIJvMzE.
30. Ron Ewart, Violence is the Final Outcome of Government Tyranny, THE
PRICE OF LIBERTY (Feb. 11, 2008), http://www.thepriceofliberty.org/08/02/11/
ewart.htm.
31. Id.; see also Sixth Victim Dies in City Hall Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7,
2008, at A29, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/07/us/07kirkwood.html.
32. See supra Part I.
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aimed at minimizing disruption so that government business can be
accomplished and citizens' voices can be heard.33
The foundation of all rules of decorum is that government may
not silence viewpoints it disfavors.34 Beyond this basic requirement, local
entities can adopt rules that require speakers to maintain relevancy and
civility when commenting.35 Rules prohibiting personal attacks have
received mixed validation from the courts.36 The "policy against
'personal attacks' focuses on two evils that could erode the beneficence
of orderly public discussion."3 These policies further the dual interests
of keeping public discussion on topic and reducing defensiveness and
33. See infra Part III for discussion of state laws concerning open meetings and
public comment sessions and the limitations placed on such sessions.
34. See infra Part III for discussion of constitutional underpinnings of rules
governing public comment sessions.
35. While it is undeniable that the First Amendment envisions the
"'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate' on public issues," it is also beyond
doubt that the freedom of speech, is not absolute. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474,
479 (1988) (quoting N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). The
Supreme Court has established "that the First Amendment does not guarantee
[persons] the right to communicate [their] views at all times and places or in any
manner that may be desired." Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452
U.S. 640, 647 (1981).
36. See Bach v. School Bd. of Va. Beach, 139 F. Supp. 2d 738, 741 (E.D. Va.
2001) (striking school board bylaw which prohibits speakers from making "attacks
or accusations regarding the honesty, character, integrity or other like personal
attributes of any identified individual"). The school board tried to distinguish
between "comments about public officials' qualifications and conduct in
administering their duties" and "attacks that are targeted at school officials in their
personal capacity." Id. at 742. In giving an example of this distinction, the school
board contended that calling someone a liar would violate the bylaw provision
against personal attacks, but saying someone lied about spending public funds for
personal use would not. Id. at 743. The court concluded that the school board was
making a distinction without a difference, and such hair-splitting would chill "robust
public debate." Id. But see Steinburg v. Chesterfield Cnty. Planning Comm'n, 527
F.3d 377, 387 (4th Cir. 2008) (concluding that "a content-neutral policy against
personal attacks is not facially unconstitutional" so long as it serves "the legitimate
public interest . .. of decorum and order"). Perhaps the distinction between Bach and
Steinburg can be explained by the specificity of the provision in the bylaw found
facially unconstitutional in Bach.
37. Steinburg, 527 F.3d at 386 (asserting that it was violative of the "no
personal attacks" policy to fail to speak on topic and to refuse to relinquish podium
after several warnings that comments were impermissible).
counter-argumentation.3 Both of these interests serve to maintain the
orderly conduct of the meeting.39
However, determining where to draw the line between disruptive
and non-disruptive conduct often causes problems of constitutional
significance. For example, a Nazi gesture, lasting one or two seconds,
made by a citizen after the close of the public comment session resulted
in a long court battle.40 The incident began in 2002, at a city council
meeting. 4 1 After the Mayor admonished a citizen speaker whose time had
expired to relinquish the podium and sit down, Mr. Norse gave a Nazi
42
salute directed at the Mayor. Having resumed the meeting, the Mayor
was unaware of Mr. Norse's gesture until another council member
brought it to his attention.43 At the direction of the Mayor, Mr. Norse was
ejected from the meeting." Mr. Norse was also ejected from a second
meeting in which he "engaged in a parade about Counsel chambers."4 5
Eight years later, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en
banc, reversed a previous decision that had affirmed the dismissal of Mr.
Norse's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim alleging a First Amendment violation,
46
and remanded the case for trial. At the time of the incident, the city's
rules of procedure for maintaining decorum in council meetings
provided:
While the Council is in session, all persons shall
preserve order and decorum. Any person making
38. Id. at 387.
39. Id. (stating that "a personal attack leads almost inevitably to a responsive
defense or counter-attack and thus to argumentation that has the real potential to
disrupt the orderly conduct of the meeting").
40. Norse v. City of Santa Cruz, 586 F.3d 697, 698 (9th Cir. 2009) (describing
procedural history of the case); reh'g granted en banc, 598 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir.
2010), rev'd in part en banc, 629 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2010).
41. Norse, 586 F.3d at 698.
42. See generally Dan Laidman, Case Note, Constitutional Law-Free Speech
Ninth Circuit Upholds City Council's Ejection of Audience Member based on Nazi
Salute: Norse v. City of Santa Cruz, 57 UCLA L. REV. Disc. 51, available at
http://uclalawreview.org/pdf/discourse/57-4.pdf (providing a good discussion of the
case prior to the Ninth Circuit's rehearing in 2010).
43. Norse, 586 F.3d at 698.
44. Laidman, supra note 42, at 55.
45. Id. at 55-56.
46. Norse v. City of Santa Cruz, 629 F.3d 966, 978 (9th Cir. 2010).
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personal, impertinent, or slanderous remarks, or
becoming boisterous shall be barred by the
presiding officer from further attendance at said
meeting unless permission for continued
attendance is granted by a majority vote of the
Council. The rules also require all speakers to
"avoid[ ] all indecorous language and references to
personalities and abid[e] by the following rules of
civil debate.
1. We may disagree, but we will be respectful of
one another
2. All comments will be directed to the issue at
hand
3. Personal attacks should be avoided.47
The city argued that any violation of its decorum rules
constituted a "disturbance" which could result in ejection from a public
meeting.48 The court disagreed, concluding that "actual disruption means
actual disruption" not "constructive disruption, technical disruption,
virtual disruption, nunc pro tunc disruption, or imaginary disruption." 49
47. Norse v. City of Santa Cruz, No. 02-01479 (RMW), 2007 WL 951854, at
*2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2007) rev'd Norse v. City of Santa Cruz, 629 F.3d 966
(2010). The rules further provided:
Finally, the rules provide that the chief of police, or
representative, shall act as ex-officio sergeant-at-arms of the
Council and "shall carry out all orders and instructions of the
presiding officer for the purpose of maintaining order and
decorum in the Council Chambers."
Upon instructions of the presiding officer it shall be the duty of
the sergeant-at-arms or any police officer present to eject from
the Council Chambers any person in the audience who uses
boisterous or profane language, or language tending to bring
the Council or any Councilmember into contempt, or any
person who interrupts and refuses to keep quiet or take a seat
when ordered to do so by the presiding officer or otherwise
disrupts the proceedings of the Council.
Id.
48. Norse, 629 F.3d at 976.
49. Id.
65
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Like the city in the Norse case, in City of Dayton v. Esrati,o the
city argued that its mayor had the authority to define what constituted a
disturbance and to eject a citizen from a commission meeting for causing
one.51 In a city commission meeting, Mr. David Esrati sat quietly
donning a ninja mask.5 After Mr. Esrati ignored several warnings to
remove the mask, he was arrested and charged with criminal trespass,
disturbing a lawful meeting, and unlawful conduct at a commission
meeting. The City of Dayton put forth several reasons for prohibiting
Mr. Esrati from wearing a mask in the commission meeting.54 According
to the city, maintaining decorum, order and control, as well as assuaging
fear for physical safety of other citizens justified the action against Mr.
Esrati.55 However, as in the Norse case, the court required the City of
Dayton to show an actual disturbance to sustain the charges against Mr.
.56Esrati.
Symbolic speech, such as a Nazi gesture or donning a ninja
mask, is not the only type of alleged disturbance for which citizens have
been removed from public meetings and subject to arrest. In Leonard v.
Robinson, Mr. Leonard used the term "god damn" when addressing the
Township Council during the citizen comment portion of the public
meeting. After a reprimand from a council member for "us[ing] the
Lord's name in vain," Mr. Leonard yelled, "I'll do whatever I want," at
which point a police officer entered the conversation.5 9 Mr. Leonard and
50. 707 N.E.2d 1140 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).
51. Id. at 1145 (highlighting the city's contention that the trial court erred in
failing to recognize that the mayor had authority to "regulate the conduct of those
attending the Commission meeting").
52. Id. at 1143.
53. Id. at 1142.
54. Id. at 1145.
55. Id. The city also articulated a fourth rationale of "affording those scheduled
to make presentations the opportunity to exercise their First Amendment rights
without distraction or hindrance. ... "Id.
56. See id at 1146-49 (affirming the trial court judgment dismissing the
charges against Mr. Esrati). The court analyzed Mr. Esrati's First Amendment right
under the symbolic speech doctrine and disagreed with the City's contention that
after the public comment session is over, a commission meeting is a nonpublic
forum. Id.
57. 477 F.3d 347 (6th Cir. 2007).
58. Id. at 352.
5 9. Id.
66 [Vol. 10
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the police officer exchanged unpleasantries, leading to Mr. Leonard's
arrest for disturbance of lawful meetings.60 Mr. Leonard claimed that his
arrest was without probable cause and in retaliation for his comments at
the council meeting. Although the legal issues concerned the actions of
the police officer rather than a council member,62 the alleged disturbance
at the public meeting subjected the speaker to criminal charges.63
Ultimately, the appellate court reversed the order of summary judgment
and remanded Mr. Leonard's claim of retaliation for exercising his First
Amendment rights.
Preventing disturbances at public meetings is essential to
achieving the dual goals of fostering citizen participation and ensuring
the efficient accomplishment of public business. To achieve these goals,
it is necessary for local entities to adopt and implement rules of
procedure for maintaining decorum in public meetings. Common among
the rules of decorum adopted by government entities for public comment
sessions are prohibitions against speech that is "repetitive," "harassing"
or "frivolous." Citizens have been denied the opportunity to speak or
ejected from public meetings for ignoring "legitimate" requests from the
presiding official to cease their comments and sit down.6 Courts have
60. Id. A video of the incident showed that "[w]hat start[ed] as a pointed, but
seemingly controlled, exchange between Leonard and a board member turn[ed] into
Leonard speaking over the board member and degenerat[ed] into Leonard losing
control and simply yelling at the board member." Id. at 364.
61. Id. at 363 (reversing the district court's order granting summary judgment
in favor of the defendants).
62. Cf Norse v. City of Santa Cruz, 586 F.3d 697 (9th Cir. 2009), reh'g
granteden banc, 598 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2010), rev'din part en banc, 629 F.3d 966
(9th Cir. 2010); Dayton v. Esrati, 707 N.E.2d 1140 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).
63. Leonard, 477 F.3d. at 352.
64. Id. at 351.
65. See Lowery v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 586 F.3d 427, 430 (6th Cir.
2009) (upholding school board policy prohibiting speech when it is "repetitive,"
"harassing" or "frivolous"); White v. City of Norwalk, 900 F.2d 1421, 1425 (9th Cir.
1990) (agreeing that it is permissible to prohibit citizen speech that is irrelevant or
repetitious); Jones v. Heyman, 888 F.2d 1328, 1333 (11th Cir. 1989) (finding a valid
ejection of speaker from city commission meeting based on "irrelevant" and
"disruptive" speech); Wright v. Anthony, 733 F.2d 575, 576 (8th Cir. 1984)
(upholding five-minute limit for speech at public hearing).
66. See L.A. Rana Enters., Inc. v. City of Aurora, 630 F. Supp. 2d 912, 923
(N.D. Ill. 2009) (upholding a three-minute time limit); Shero v. City of Grove, 510
67
68 FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol.10
deemed the following "legitimate" reasons to silence a speaker: when the
speaker has exceeded his allotted time limit;67 debated irrelevancies;6
pursued repetitive debate;69 discussed matters of private concern;70 or
71delivered comments in a harassing, insulting manner.
A presiding official must be tasked with the responsibility of
cutting off irrelevant, repetitive and caustic debates to avoid free-for-alls
F.3d 1196, 1203 (10th Cir. 2007) (asserting that three-minute time limit to speak at
public comment portion of city council meeting did not constitute a prior restraint in
violation of the First Amendment); Wright, 733 F.2d at 577 (upholding five-minute
time limit for public comments in public hearing on Social Security reforms). Cf
Rowe v. City of Cocoa, 358 F.3d 800, 803 (2004) (expressing concern over the need
to avoid "interminable" meetings) (citing Heyman, 888 F.2d at 1333).
67. See IA. Rana Enters., 630 F. Supp. at 923; Shero, 410 F.3d at 1203;
Wright, 733 F.2d at 577.
68. See Steinburg v. Chesterfield Cnty. Planning Comm'n, 527 F.3d 377
(2008) (agreeing that removal from public meeting for failure to restrict comments to
the only topic for consideration at the commission's meeting did not violate the First
Amendment rights of the speaker); White, 900 F.2d at 1425 (finding it permissible to
limit public comments to only those topics on the agenda).
69. See Lowery, 586 F.3d 427 (rejecting parents' request to speak at a school
board meeting because the proposed topic was repetitive of the parents' comments at
the previous board meeting did not constitute a prior restraint in violation of the First
Amendment); Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 281 (3d Cir. 2004)
(holding that removing of speaker from Township Board of Supervisors meeting
during public comment session because he was "repetitive and truculent" and
"repeatedly interrupted the chairman of the meeting" did not violate the First
Amendment).
70. See Mitchell v. Hillsborough Cnty., 468 F.3d 1276, 1284 (11th Cir. 2006)
(determining whether government employee speech is a matter of public concern or
private speech for purposes of First Amendment protection, and finding that
although speech was a private matter there was no retaliatory claim when employee
was terminated for vulgar comments during public comment portion of county
commission meeting); Eichenlaub, 385 F.3d at 281 (stating that "[o]ne would
certainly not expect the forum of a Township meeting to include . . . arguments
about private disputes involving town citizens"). However, the court in Eichenlaub
went on to note that the distinction between public concern and private matters is not
relevant outside of the government employment context, and Plaintiff's private land
use grievance with the Township is protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 285.
71. Mitchell, 468 F.3d at 1288 (maintaining that "vulgar, vituperative, ad
hominem attack" against a county commissioner during the public comment session
is not entitled to First Amendment protection); Lowery, 586 F.3d at 435 (stating that
"harassing" speech threatening legal action can be excluded from public comment
session of school board meeting without violating the First Amendment).
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and interminably long meetings." Neutral rules provide guidance to
officials conducting public meetings who must decide what constitutes a
disruption and at what point the speaker should be silenced so that
government business can proceed and other citizens can be heard.
However, neutral rules of general applicability become vehicles of
government censorship when government entities and officials enforce
rules of decorum in a selective and arbitrary manner.
Members of the public do not have a constitutionally guaranteed
right "to be heard by public bodies making decisions of policy."73
However, when state and local laws create a forum for citizen input at
public meetings, constitutional guarantees apply. 74 What level of
constitutional protection is afforded citizen speech in public comment
sessions will be discussed after surveying various states' open meeting
laws and the rules of decorum that govern them.
III. A SURVEY OF OPEN MEETING LAWS AND RULES OF DECORUM
While every state has Open Meetings Laws, not every state's
Open Meetings Laws address whether there is a right to participate in
public meetings. Where the Open Meetings Law does not specifically
provide for the right of public participation, other statutes or judicial fiat
76
may create this right. Some state statutes limit the right for public
72. Cf Lowery, 586 F.3d at 431.
73. Minnesota State Bd. for Cmty. Coll. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 284 (1984)
(quoting Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441,445 (1915)
("'Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people it is impracticable that
every one should have a direct voice in its adoption."')).
74. See infra Part III.
75. The states that do not specifically address the right to participate in public
meetings are: Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West
Virginia, and Wyoming.
76. In Texas and Minnesota, the courts have created the right to speak at public
meetings. See Eudaly v. City of Colleyville, 642 S.W.2d 75, 77 (Tex. Ct. App.
1982); Claude v. Collins, 518 N.W.2d 836, 841 (Minn. 1994).
comment to specific organizations." For example, in both Alabama and
North Carolina, specific statutes require an opportunity for public
comment at the Board of Commissioners and Board of Education
.78meetings.
In Texas and Minnesota, where the Open Meetings Laws are
silent as to public participation, the courts have weighed in on the issue.79
The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that one of the purposes of the
statute is to "afford the public an opportunity to present its views."80 In
Texas, a court distinguished between "public meetings," where the
public is not entitled to comment, and "public hearings," where the
public is entitled to comment.
In Florida, both the legislature and the courts have provided for
and supported the right to public participation in public meetings.82 The
Florida Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of public
participation in open meetings, stating that "specified boards and
commissions . . . should not be allowed to deprive the public of this
inalienable right to be present and to be heard at all deliberations wherein
decisions affecting the public are being made."83
77. ALA. CODE § 11-44-127, (2008) (Board of Commissioners), § 16-8-3
(2008) (Board of Education); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-l 10, (2000) (Board of
Commissioners).
78. ALA. CODE § 11-44-127 (stating that all meetings of city board of
commissioners are open to the public "and every citizen of the-municipality shall
have a right to be heard on any subject relating to the business or conduct of the
municipality"); ALA. CODE § 16-8-3 (asserting that county boards of education must
hold an annual meeting to give the public an opportunity to present "to the board
matters relating to the allotment of public school finds or any other matter relating
to the administration of the public schools of the county"); N.C. GEN. STAT. §1 13A-
110(e) ("Prior to adoption or subsequent amendment of any land-use plan, the body
charged with its preparation and adoption . . . shall hold a public hearing at which
public and private parties shall have the opportunity to present comments and
reccomendations.").
79. See Eudaly, 642 S.W.2d at 77; Claude, 518 N.W.2d at 841.
80. Claude, 518 N.W.2d at 841 (quoting St. Cloud Newspapers, Inc. v. Dist.
742 Cmty. Sch., 332 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. 1983)).
81. Eudaly, 642 S.W.2d at 77.
82. See FLA. STAT. § 286.0115(2)(b) (2009) (stating that members of the
public have the right to participate in "quasi-judicial proceedings on local
government land-use matters").
83. Bd. of Pub. Instruction of Broward Cnty. v. Doran, 224 So.2d 693, 699
(Fla. 1969).
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The Open Meetings Laws of other states specifically provide for
the right to participate in public meetings. Arizona allows members of
the public to address the public body on any issue within that body's
jurisdiction, but only if an open call to the public has been made during
the public meeting. In Nebraska, while citizens have the right to speak
at public meetings, the public body may choose to prevent citizen
comments at public meetings as long as the public body does not forbid
-86
public participation at all meetings.
California requires that members of the public have an
opportunity to speak at public meetings on agenda items at the time the
governing body considers the specific agenda item.87 The California
statutes also protect public criticism of the policies, procedures,
programs or services of the body, or the acts or omissions of the body.
84. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 92-3 (2007) (providing that citizens must be
permitted to submit data, views, or arguments, in writing as well as through
comments at meetings); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42:5(D) (2006) (requiring each
public body to provide an opportunity for public comment at meetings); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 7-1-4142 (2009), § 2-3-111 (2009) (stating that local governments are
required to allow for "reasonable opportunity to submit data, views, or arguments"
regarding decisions that are of significant interest to the public); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
10:4-12(a) (2010) (requiring a public body to set aside a portion of time in every
meeting for public comment on any governmental issue that a citizen feels may be of
concern); 65 PA. CONS. STAT. § 710.1(a) (2010) (requiring that there be a
"reasonable opportunity" for all those who have standing to "comment on matters of
concern, official action or deliberation which are or may be before the board or
council prior to taking official action"); VT. STAT. ANN. Tit. 1, § 1-312(h) (2010)
(maintaining that the public has the right to "express its opinion" on any matter
under consideration at the public meeting, however, this right does not apply to
quasi-judicial proceedings); Wis. STAT. § 227.18(l)(c) (2009) (contending that
public bodies are required to "afford each interested person or representative the
opportunity to present facts, opinions or arguments in writing, whether or not there is
an opportunity to present them orally"); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-
43 1.01(G) (2011); NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-1412(2) (2008).
85. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38-431.01(G).
86. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1412(2).
87. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 11125.7(a), 54954.3(a) (2010) (indicating that the
public body does not have to listen to comments on items that are not on the agenda
or comments that were previously considered in a prior meeting where there was an
opportunity to comment).
88. Id. at § 11125.7(c), 54954.3(c).
In other states, the Open Meetings Laws expressly limit or
narrowly define public participation. In Maryland, New York, and
Washington, there is no statutory right to participation, only the right to
watch and listen at public meetings. 90 In Oklahoma, the Attorney General
has stated that neither the Open Meetings Laws nor "the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution [provides] an opportunity
for citizens to express their view on issues being considered by a public
body, but a public body may voluntarily choose to allow for such
comments." 91 Further, case law in Mississippi states that citizens are not
participants and are not permitted to interfere with "discussion,
deliberation or decision-making" at public meetings. 92
Almost all states that allow some form of public participation
allow the public body to impose reasonable regulations on the public's
participation.93 In Florida, one court has held that "to deny the presiding
officer the authority to regulate irrelevant debate and disruptive behavior
at a public meeting . . . would cause such meetings to drag on
interminably, and deny others the opportunity to voice their opinions." 9 4
In Louisiana, the public body may limit public comment only as
specified by reasonable rules and regulations and to prevent "willful[]
disrupt[ion]" that would "seriously compromise[]" the "orderly conduct
of [a] meeting." 95 Arizona, Oklahoma and California have expressly
89. See IND. CODE § 5-14-1.5-3(a) (maintaning that the public is only allowed
to "observe and record" public meetings).
90. MD. CODE ANN. STATE Gov'T. § 10-501(a) (2009); N.Y. GOv'T LAW § 7-
100 (2008); WASH. REV. CODE § 42 30-030 (2006).
91. 26 Okla. Op. Att'y Gen. 152, 155 (2002). See also 45 Okla. Op. Att'y Gen.
211 (1998) (discussing the same idea that neither the Act nor the First Amendment
grants the public the right to be heard).
92. Hinds Co. Bd. of Supervisors v. Common Cause, 551 So. 2d 107, 110
(Miss. 1989).
93. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-431.01(H) (2011); CAL. GOv'T CODE §§
11125.7(b), 54954.3(b) (2010); FLA. STAT. § 286.0115(3) (2009); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 92-3 (2007); MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T. § 10-507(b) (2009); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 84-1412(2) (2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 312(h) (2010); W. VA. CODE § 6-9A-3
(2010); Wis. STAT. § 227-18(3)(c) (2009).
94. Jones v. Heyman, 888 F.2d 1328, 1333 (11th Cir. 1989).
95. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42:17(c) (2006 & Supp. 2011).
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stated that public bodies can limit public participation by imposing
reasonable "time, place and manner restrictions."96
Both Texas and Maryland, while allowing public bodies to limit
public participation by adopting reasonable rules and regulations, require
training for public officials aimed at informing them about Open
Meetings Laws. 9 7 Texas requires each elected or appointed public
official to complete a training course, overseen by the Attorney General,
regarding the responsibilities of the governmental body and its members
under the Open Meetings Laws. Maryland has created an "Open
Meeting Law Compliance Board" to review open meeting complaints
and violations. 9 9 It reviews current Open Meetings Laws, makes
recommendations to the legislature regarding Open Meetings Laws, and
develops educational programs aimed at informing the public bodies
about Open Meetings Laws.100
The Open Meetings Laws of some states account for the
possibility of disruptive citizens at public meetings. 01 Delaware allows
for those who are "willfully and seriously disruptive" to be escorted out
of the meeting.102 In Louisiana, if someone, acting willfully, "seriously
compromise[s]" the orderly conduct of the meeting, the public body may
remove that person.io3 Similarly in Washington and California, if a
96. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 38-431.01(H) (2011); Baca v. Moreno Valley United
Sch. Dist., 936 F. Supp. 719, 730 (C.D. Cal. 1996); 45 Okla. Op, Att'y Gen. 211
(1998).
97. MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T. § 10-502.4(d) (2009). See Op. Tex. Att'y
Gen. No. JC-0 169 (2000) (citations omitted).
98. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 551.005 (2004 & Supp. 2010).
99. MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T. § 10-502.1 (2009).
100. Id. §10-502.4.
101. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 241.030(4)(b) (2010) (allowing for the removal of
a "person who willfully disrupts a meeting to the extent that . . . orderly conduct is
made impractical"); W. VA. CODE § 6-9A-3 (2010) (stating that a member of the
public may be removed if they "disrupt[] the meeting to the extent that orderly
conduct of the meeting is compromised"); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 16-4-406 (1990)
(allowing the public body to prevent willful disruption that inhibits the orderly
conduct of the meeting by either removal of the offending party or ending the
meeting); see also, CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 54957.9 (2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29
§ 10004(d) (2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42:17(c) (2006 & Supp. 2011); WASH.
REV. CODE § 42.30.050 (2006).
102. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29 § 10004(d).
103. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §42:17(c).
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meeting is interrupted "so as to render the orderly conduct of the meeting
unfeasible, and order cannot be restored by the removal of' those causing
the disruption, the members of the governing body "may order the
meeting room cleared" of all citizens and may continue the meeting in
private.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO PUBLIC COMMENT
SESSIONS
The right to participate in public meetings is not a constitutional
right, but one created by statute or judicial fiat. Once created, however,
constitutional protections from government interference apply to citizens
who comment at public meetings.
It has long been recognized that discussion of public issues lies
"at the heart of the First Amendment[]."105 Free and uninhibited political
discussion is so essential to our constitutional system that it is considered
vital to "'the security of . . . [our] Republic."" 6 "'[I]t is a prized
American privilege to speak one's mind, although not always with
perfect good taste, on all public institutions[.]' 107 However, despite the
104. CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 54957.9 (2010) (stating that if a meeting is
"willfully interrupted," the public body may order the room cleared if removal of the
disruptive person does not restore order; the body may only consider items on the
agenda; and the body must allow members of the press not involved in the
disturbance to stay); WASH. REV. CODE § 42 30-050 (stating that if there is an
interrupption, only matters listed on the agenda may be considered and that members
of the press not involved in the disruption must be allowed to attend the private
session).
105. First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978).
106. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (quoting Stromberg v.
Califorina, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)) (recognizing that common law defamation,
applied to claims of public officials, has a chilling effect on political speech and
creating a constitutional rule for public official defamation to ensure wide-open and
robust public debate).
107. Id. (quoting Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941)).
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unequivocal language of the First Amendment, 08 it has never been
interpreted literally nor considered an absolute freedom.' 09
The First Amendment affects government restrictions on private
speech and the constitutional validity of government speech restrictions
depends on the "what and where" of those restrictions." 0 Although First
Amendment protection is at its zenith when public debate is involved,"'
that maxim does not hold true when the discourse occurs in public
meetings because "the government's ability to limit private expression in
a public context"' 12 depends upon the forum in which it occurs.
A. Forum Analysis
The public forum doctrine is judicially created and relates to the
use of government property for expressive activity.114 Over one hundred
years ago, the Court viewed public property like private property, with
the government as owner having power to forbid its use to members of
108. "Congress shall make no law . .. abridging the freedom of speech . . .
U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
109. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ("The most
stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in
a theatre and causing panic.").
110. See generally Snyder v. Phelps, _ U.S. , 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). In
general, speech restrictions that target the message, its impact, or the speaker receive
the highest scrutiny. See id. Content-based restrictions are presumptively invalid and
the government bears the burden to show that the restriction is necessary to serve a
compelling government interest. See id. When the speech restriction targets the time,
place, or manner of speech and is unrelated to the content of the speech, intermediate
scrutiny applies. See id. The government also bears the burden to satisfy the
intermediate scrutiny test. See id. The government must show that the restriction is
narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and leaves open ample
alternative channels of communication. See id.
111. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) ("The First Amendment affords
the broadest protection . . . to . .. political expression ..... ).
112. Leventhal v. Vista Unified Sch. Dist., 973 F. Supp. 951, 956 (S.D. Cal.
1997).
113. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, _, 129 S. Ct. 1125,
1132 (2009) (explaining the three-tier public forum doctrine).
114. Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, U.S. _, _, 130 S. Ct. 2971,
2984 (2010) ("[I]n a progression of cases, [the Supreme] Court has employed forum
analysis to determine when a governmental entity, in regulating property in its
charge, may place limitations on speech.").
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the public."' Eventually, the Supreme Court modified its restrictive view
of public property, understanding that streets and parks, as traditional
public forums, belonged to the people for public use.'6
Over time, the public forum analysis has developed into a three-
tiered doctrine.1 Government property is sorted into three categories:
(1) traditional public forums; (2) designated public forums; and (3)
limited public forums." 8 Speech restrictions "in traditional public
forums, such as public streets and parks," receive the highest scrutiny.' 9
A designated public forum is "government property that has not
traditionally been regarded as a public forum, [but is] intentionally
opened up for that purpose." 20 Speech restrictions in designated public
forums are scrutinized under the same standard as restrictions in
traditional public forums.121 Lastly, limited public forums are created
when government property, traditionally not dedicated to public use, is
opened, but "limited to use by certain groups or dedicated solely to the
115. Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 47 (1897) ("For the legislature
absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public park is
no more an infringement of the rights of a member of the public than for the owner
of a private house to forbid it in his house.").
116. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (finding an
ordinance prohibiting distribution of leaflets and pamphlets on city streets facially
unconstitutional and that the use of streets and parks for the public to assemble, to
communicate, and to discuss public questions, "has, from ancient times, been a part
of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens").
117. Christian Legal Soc'y, U.S. at _ n.11, 130 S. Ct. at 2984 n.Il
(citing Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at -, 129 S. Ct. at 1132); but see WILLIAM
W. VAN ALSTYNE, THE AMERICAN FIRST AMENDMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY: CASES AND MATERIALS, 496 n.86 (4th ed. 2011) ("Or is it ... a four-
forum approach: (a) traditional public forum, (b) dedicated public forum, (c)
'limited' public forum, (d) 'nonpublic' forum?").
118. Christian Legal Soc'y, U.S. at _ n.11, 130 S. Ct. at 2984 n.11
(citing Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at _, 129 S. Ct. at 1132).
119. Id. (stating that a content-based restriction, aimed at silencing the
message, its effect or the speaker, in a traditional public forum "must be narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling government interest").
120. Id. But see VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 117.
121. Christian Legal Soc'y, U.S. at _ n.11, 130 S. Ct. at 2984 n.11
(citing Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at _, 129 S. Ct. at 1132).
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discussion of certain subjects." 22 Unlike traditional and designated
public forums, speech restrictions in limited public forums can be
content-based, so long as they are "reasonable and viewpoint neutral." 23
While the Supreme Court's recently articulated rules of the
public forum doctrine can be clearly and simply stated, their application
is anything but straightforward. There is no Supreme Court decision
stating in what type of forum public comment sessions fall.124 Without
Supreme Court precedent, the circuit courts have developed their own
rules in applying the public forum doctrine to public comment
sessions.125 It is fair to say that the circuit courts' jurisprudence in this
area is a morass of confusion.126 The First,127 Second, 12 Third,129 Fifth,130
122. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 2984. (stating that government may impose
speech restrictions in limited public forums, so long as the restrictions are
"reasonable and viewpoint neutral").
123. Id.
124. See Fairchild v. Liberty Indep. Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 747, 759 n.42 (5th
Cir. 2010) (citing City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wis. Emp't Relations
Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976)) (discussing that the Supreme Court's holding that
non-union teachers could not be prohibited from speaking at a school board meeting
was based on the conclusion that the applicable state statute was not viewpoint
neutral, not on a determination that a school board meeting is designated as a public
forum).
125. See infra notes 127-38.
126. See Bowman v. White, 444 F.3d 967, 975 (8th Cir. 2006) (discussing the
confusion among the circuit courts on what constitutes a designated public forum).
127. Ridley v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 390 F.3d 65, 76 n.4 (1st Cir. 2004)
("The phrase 'limited public forum' has been used in different ways.").
128. N.Y. Magazine v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 136 F.3d 123, 128 n.2 (2d Cir.
1998) (describing a limited public forum as a sub-category of the designated public
forum).
129. Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 281 (3d Cir. 2004)
(discussing a sliding-scale standard for a designated public forum, which "allows for
content-related regulation so long as the content is tied to the limitations that frame
the scope of the designation, and so long as the regulation is neutral as to viewpoint
within the subject matter of that content"). However, the Third Circuit's sliding-
scale standard is contrary to the Supreme Court's recently articulated standard for a
designated public forum. Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, U.S. , _ ,
n. 11, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2984 n. 11 (2010) (citing Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,
555 U.S. 460, , 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1132 (2009)) ("Government restrictions on
speech in a designated public forum are subject to the same strict scrutiny as
restrictions in a traditional public forum.").
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Sixth,' Eighth, 13 and Tenthl33 Circuit Courts of Appeals have struggled
with the distinction between a "designated public forum" and a "limited
public forum," and consequently, remain unclear how to categorize
public comment sessions.134 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
seemingly categorized citizen comment sessions as "limited public
forums," but applied the standard of scrutiny for a "designated public
forum."l35 In contrast, the Fourthl36 and Ninthl3 Circuit Courts of
130. Fairchild v. Liberty Indep. Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 747, 758 n.38 (5th Cir.
2010) (citing Chiu v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., 260 F.3d 330, 346 (5th Cir. 2001))
(discussing that the line separating designated and limited public forums "remains
undefined"). However, the court was inconsistent in describing the type of forum
and applicable standard it ascribed to the public comment session. In one portion of
its opinion, the court concluded that the rules adopted for the Liberty Independent
School District's public comment sessions created a limited public forum, applying a
reasonable, viewpoint-neutral standard. Id. at 760. A page later in its opinion, the
court applied an intermediate scrutiny standard to the challenged rules, stating
"[t]hese rules were designed to serve a substantial government interest and allow for
reasonable alternative [channels of] communication." Id. at 761.
131. Lowery v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 586 F.3d 427, 432 (6th Cir.
2009) (categorizing the public comment session at a school board meeting as both a
"designated" and "limited" public forum).
132. Bowman v. White, 444 F.3d 967, 975 (10th Cir. 2007) ("Substantial
confusion exists regarding what distinction, if any, exists between a 'designated
public forum' and a 'limited public forum."').
133. Shero v. City of Grove, 510 F.3d 1196, 1202 ("Under our precedent, it is
not entirely clear whether a city council meeting should be treated as a 'designated
public forum' or a 'limited public forum."').
134. See supra notes 127-33.
135. Rowe v. City of Cocoa, 358 F.3d 800, 802-03 (11th Cir. 2004) (stating
that in a limited public forum, government speech restrictions that are content
neutral and regulate the time, place, and manner of speech must be narrowly tailored
to serve a significant government interest). However, later in its opinion, the court
seemed to contradict itself. The court upheld the residency requirement for citizens
to speak in the open session of the city council meeting because the limitation was
considered reasonable and viewpoint neutral. Id. at 804; see Christian Legal Soc'y v.
Martinez, _ U.S. _, _ n 11, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2984 n.11 (2010) (citing Pleasant
Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. _, _, 129 S. Ct. 1125 1132 (2009)) (stating
that in a limited public forum, government speech restrictions must be reasonable
and viewpoint neutral).
136. Steinburg v. Chesterfield Cnty. Planning Comm'n, 527 F.3d 377, 385
(4th Cir. 2008) (finding that a public meeting is a limited public forum, which
permits reasonable restrictions "to preserve the civility and decorum necessary to
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Appeals have applied, without equivocation, the current standard
articulated by the Supreme Court for limited public forums, thereby,
permitting speech restrictions on citizen comments in public meetings
which are reasonable and viewpoint neutral.138
Much of the confusion in the circuit courts' public forum
jurisprudence can be traced to earlier Supreme Court cases which used
different terminology for the categories of public property currently
termed "designated public forum" and "limited public forum." For
example, in United States v. Kokinda,139 the Court used the term
''nonpublic forum' to categorize a sidewalk near the entrance of a post
office, located entirely on postal service property.140 When members of
an advocacy group placed a table on the post office sidewalk for the
purpose of soliciting contributions and distributing literature, they were
arrested for violating a federal statute prohibiting the solicitation of
contributions on postal premises. 141 The Court upheld the no solicitation
regulation as applied, stating that "the regulation . . . must be analyzed
under the standards set forth for nonpublic fora: It must be reasonable
and 'not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials
oppose the speaker's view.",14 2 In a case challenging a prohibition on
solicitation in a public airport terminal, the Court again used the term
further the forum's purpose of conducting public business[,]" but restrictions must
be viewpoint neutral).
137. Norse v. City of Santa Cruz, 629 F.3d 966, 975 (9th Cir. 2010) (defining
city council meetings open to the public as limited public forums, requiring speech
restrictions to be reasonable and viewpoint neutral).
138. Christian Legal Soc'y, U.S. at _ n.11, 130 S. Ct. at 2984 n.11
(citing Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at _, 129 S. Ct. at 1132) (holding that in a
limited public forum, government speech restrictions must be reasonable and
viewpoint neutral).
139. 497 U.S. 720 (1990). Specifically, in Kokinda, the Court upheld a
conviction of advocacy group members for violating a federal regulation prohibiting
any person from soliciting contributions on postal premises because the Court
decided that the sidewalk in front of the post office, located entirely on postal service
property, was a nonpublic forum. Id. at 731.
140. Id. at 730.
141. Id. at 723-24.
142. Id. at 730 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n,
460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983)).
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"nonpublic forum." 4 3 Holding that terminals are nonpublic forums,'44
the Court applied a reasonable, viewpoint neutral standard to the airport
terminal's no solicitation regulation.145 In these earlier cases, the Court
used the terminology "nonpublic forum" for government property now
categorized as "limited public forum."
To further confuse the public forum analysis, the Supreme Court
defined a designated public forum, as having either a limited or unlimited
character.146 The difference between the "limited" designated public
forum and the "unlimited" designated public forum is whether the
government has opened up the property for expressive activity "by part
or all of the public."' 47 Whatever the character of the designated
property, "[r]egulation of such property is subject to the same limitations
as that governing a traditional public forum." 4 8
Given the Court's various mutations of terminology applied to
the second and third categories of public property-designated public
forum, whether limited or unlimited, and nonpublic forum-it is
completely understandable why the circuit courts' "analysis of what
constitutes a 'designated public forum' . . . is far from lucid." 4 9 One
might question the importance of unraveling the confusion in
terminology and the futility in placing a label on public comment
sessions. However, the characterization of the forum dictates which party
has the burden to justify a challenged speech restriction and the level of
143. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679
(1992) (determining that terminals are nonpublic forums, and regulations on
expressive activity in nonpublic forums "need only be reasonable, as long as the
regulation is not an effort to suppress the speaker's activity due to disagreement with
the speaker's view").
144. Id.
145. Id. at 683; see also Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund,
Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985) (determining that a fundraising drive for charitable
purposes in the federal workplace was a nonpublic forum); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S.
828 (1976) (determining that a military base is a nonpublic forum); Lehman v.
Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (determining that the car card space for
advertising on a public bus is a nonpublic forum).
146. Int'l Society for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 672 (defining the
second category of public property as a designated public forum and as having a
limited or unlimited character).
147. Id. at 678.
148. Id.
149. Bowman v. White, 444 F.3d 967, 975 (8th Cir. 2006).
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scrutiny or deference a court should give to the legislative explanation
for the restriction.
Some of the cases upon which the circuit courts have relied
address the public forum doctrine in the context of a school mail
system; 150  university meeting facilities;"' an annual charitable
fundraising drive;152 and a student activities fund.153 In each of these
cases, groups sought use of government facilities or funds to hold
meetings or to disseminate their message.154 Unlike the unilateral use of
government property at issue in the above-mentioned cases, participation
in a public meeting consists of a dialectic discourse, involving multiple
voices.1 15 Public comment sessions have more of the characteristics of
the quintessential public forum political debate, involving face-to-face,
real-time discourse between citizens and their elected officials on matters
of public concern.156 Nevertheless, a public comment session is neither a
pubic forum nor an "unlimited" designated public forum.
As the modern public forum doctrine evolved, an elements-based
approach was used to determine whether government opened a non-
traditional forum for public discourse, focusing on "the policy and
150. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37
(1983) (holding that a school mail facility is not a public forum and a reasonableness
standard applied to the state's distinction between the exclusive bargaining
representative and its rival in using the system for communication).
151. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1982) (finding a state university's
policy created a public forum for use of its meeting facilities by student groups).
152. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund. Inc., 473 U.S. 788
(1985) (holding that an annual charitable fundraising drive in the federal workplace
is a nonpublic forum and excluding some advocacy organizations satisfied the
reasonableness standard).
153. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819
(1995) (characterizing the student activities fund as a limited public forum,
prohibiting the state from discriminating based on viewpoint).
154. See supra notes 150-53.
155. See supra notes 150-53.
156. But see Fairchild v. Liberty Indep. Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 747, 760 (5th Cir.
2010) (finding the school district's public comment session lacked the characteristics
of a public debate because the rules did not permit the School Board to deliberate or
to take action on any subject that is raised and stating, instead, that the purposes of
the comment session were learning about topics that the Board may take up at a later
time and routing citizen or employee concerns to administrative procedures when
appropriate).
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practice of the government, the nature of the property and its
'compatibility' with expressive activity." 157 Circuit courts have mirrored
this elements-based approach by focusing on two factors: (1)"'the
government's policy and practice with respect to the forum,"' and (2) "
'the nature of the forum and its compatibility with the [speech] at
issue.",i15
In determining whether a public comment session should be
characterized as a designated public forum, a limited public forum, or a
nonpublic forum (depending on the nomenclature being used), the
elements-based approach can provide guidance. The government's intent
with respect to the public comment session can be construed from the
statute creating the right for public participation in public meetings.
Looking to the nature of a public meeting and its compatibility with
public participation, the forum designation depends upon the relative
value placed on accomplishing government business versus promoting
. 159
citizen participation.
Like so many of the circuit courts that place open comment
sessions somewhere between a designated public forum and a limited
public forum, this "hybrid" public forum category strikes the proper
balance between protecting efficient government business and promoting
citizen participation. While the Supreme Court, in its most recent cases,
did not include in the list of forum categories a "limited" designated
public forum,'so it is not without precedent to recognize a fourth type of
157. See RUSSELL L. WEAVER, CATHERINE HANCOCK, DONAL E. LIVELY and
JOHN C. KNECHTLE, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS,
252 (Matthew Bender & Co., 2008) (discussing the elements of Justice O'Connor's
approach to defining a public forum in Cornelius, 473 U.S. 788, and used by Justice
Kennedy in his dissent in Int'l Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505
U.S. 672 (1992)).
158. Estiverne v. La. State Bar Ass'n, 863 F.2d 371, 380 n.14 (5th Cir.
1989)(quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802).
159. See supra notes 114-58 and accompanying text.
160. See Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, _ U.S. , n.l 1, 130 S. Ct.
2971, 2984 n.11 (2010) (citing Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. , ,
129 S. Ct. 1125, 1132 (2009)); see VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 117. The legal issues
addressed in these cases focused on the government speech doctrine and a
university's antidiscrimination policy, not the public forum doctrine. See supra note
117. Therefore, the Court's list of three categories of public forums is merely dicta.
Further, the Court has never directly addressed the application of the public forum
doctrine to open comment sessions in public meetings.
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public forum. Some have suggested that the public forum doctrine does
include a fourth category, using the terminology: traditional, dedicated or
designated, limited, and nonpublic forums."6
If the Court were to address the application of the public forum
doctrine to open comment sessions in public meetings, the Court should
recognize, as the circuit courts have, the unique aspect of this type of
forum.162 Unlike expressive activities in traditional public forums, public
meetings have a dual purpose of conducting government business and
promoting public discourse. However, citizen participation in public
meetings is more than the use of government property to disseminate a
unitary message, such as the nonpublic forum of a school mail system.163
Therefore, comment sessions should be categorized as a
"limited" designated public forum (or limited forum in a four category
scheme). Under this category, speech may be limited to the subject
matter of the forum's jurisdiction, but any further restrictions would be
subject to the same level of scrutiny applicable to speech restrictions in
traditional and designated public forums. Of course, a statute may create
a nonpublic forum by further limiting public comments, such as limiting
comments to agenda items only or allocating discretion to the
government entity to hold public comment sessions. Then, the comment
session would be a "true" nonpublic forum, subject to a standard of
reasonableness and viewpoint neutrality.
Concluding that a public comment session is a "limited"
designated public forum protects the dual goals of conducting
government business in an orderly and efficient manner and providing
the opportunity for citizens to voice their opinions on matters of public
concern. Subjecting government restrictions on citizen participation to a
heightened standard of scrutiny upholds the importance placed on public
discussion of public matters without sacrificing efficiency in government
business. Even in the non-traditional forum of a public meeting, the right
161. See VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 117, at 496 n.86 (suggesting a four-forum
approach: "(a) traditional public forum, (b) dedicated or designated public forum, (c)
'limited' public forum, (d) 'nonpublic' forum").
162. See supra notes 127-38.
163. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37
(1983) (holding that a school mail facility is not a public forum and a reasonableness
standard applied to the state's distinction between the exclusive bargaining
representative and its rival in using the system for communication).
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of public participation is consistent with "a fundamental principle of the
American form of government."'6
B. Government Employees' Speech Rights in Public Comment Sessions
First Amendment rights afforded to citizens who speak in public
comment sessions do not apply with equal force to government
employees.165 The "recently minted government speech doctrine"l66
imposes another layer of confusion to this already complex area of the
law. The Supreme Court explained the government speech doctrine in a
recent case involving a city's right to accept or deny privately donated
monuments to be permanently installed in a public park.167 Beginning
with the premise that "[t]he Free Speech Clause . . . does not regulate
government speech," the Court concluded that the government is free to
168
pick and choose the content and viewpoint of its own message. When
the government speaks or when "it enlists private entities to convey its
message," it may "regulate the content of what is or is not expressed."1 69
164. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 275 (1964) (citations omitted)
(paraphrasing James Madison).
165. Garcetti v. Cebballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006) (holding that not all
speech by a public employee is protected by the First Amendment and stating that
"[w]hen a citizen enters government service, the citizen by necessity much accept
certain limitations on his or her freedom").
166. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, _, 129 S. Ct. 1125,
1139 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring) (disagreeing with majority's reliance on "the
recently minted government speech doctrine").
167. Id. at 1129-30 (majority opinion); Id. at 1139 (Stevens, J. concurring)
(discussing that a religious organization wanted to install a stone monument
containing its religious precepts in the city park that was similar to a monument
containing the Ten Commandments which was privately donated and permanently
installed in the city park).
168. Id. at 1131 (citing Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass'n., 544 U.S. 550,
553 (2005)) ("[T]he Government's own speech ... is exempt from First Amendment
scrutiny"); see also id. (citing Nat'l Endowment for Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569,
598 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("It is the very business of government to favor
and disfavor points of view.")).
169. Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at _, 129 S. Ct. at 1131 (quoting
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (2000)).
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This limitation on First Amendment speech rights applies when
government employees speak in their official capacity. 170 Articulating its
employee-speech doctrine, the Court has consistently held that "when
public employees are making statements pursuant to their official duties,
the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment
purposes."l71 In employee-speech cases, the beginning premise is that the
government cannot condition public employment on the relinquishment
of constitutionally protected rights of freedom of expression.172 However,
in these cases, the Court has made a distinction between situations in
which an employee speaks "as a citizen upon matters of public
concern"173 and when the employee speaks in his or her official
capacity.174 Further, government employees cannot use the First
Amendment to "constitutionalize" an employee grievance.175
There are competing interests involved in treating government
employee "official" speech differently from speech spoken as a citizen
on matters of public concern for First Amendment purposes.176
Government employees' "official" speech implicates the employer-
employee relationship. 17 7 Like private employers, government employers
need to exercise control over their employees to ensure the workplace
170. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
17 1. Id.
172. See id. at 413 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983)).
173. Id. at 416 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 146-47). In determining whether
an employee's speech is a matter of public concern, the Court looks to "the content,
form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record." Connick,
461 U.S. at 147-48.
174. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 415-16 (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Edu. of Twp.
High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cty., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)); see also Connick, 461 U.S. at
146-47 (discussing that when government employees claim retaliatory discharge for
exercising their First Amendment right of freedom of expression, the beginning
inquiry is "whether the expressions in question were made by the speaker 'as a
citizen upon matters of public concern"').
175. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 420 (stating that although the First Amendment
gives public employees certain rights, "it does not empower them to
'constitutionalize' the employee grievance" (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 154)).
176. Id. at 430 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that public employees enjoy a
qualified speech protection that balances "the tension between individual and public
interest in the speech . . . and the government's interest in operating efficiently
without distraction or embarrassment by talkative or headline-grabbing employees").
177. Id.
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functions efficiently.178 Furthermore, public employees' speech can be
imputed to the government, "contraven[ing] governmental policies or
impair[ing] the proper performance of governmental functions."l79
In contrast to promoting efficiency and discipline in the
workforce and ensuring government policy is expressed as a "single"
voice, the public's right to know about the conduct and misconduct of
government entities is affected by government employee speech
restrictions. Government employees are often the best source of
information about the performance of governmental entities and public
officials. st Open and robust discussion about public entities and public
officials is at the core of First Amendment protected speech.182
Therefore, any restriction on public employees from speaking on the
inefficiency or misconduct of their government employers inhibits the
public's First Amendment right to know information essential to self-
183
governance.
Trying to balance these competing interests in the context of a
public comment forum can create a plethora of problems from a First
Amendment perspective. While it is constitutionally permissible to
exclude a public employee's employment grievance from public
comment sessions,184 it is not at all clear whether a public employee's
general dissatisfaction with job related matters is off limits. Perhaps, the
178. Id. at 419 (majority opinion).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 419-20.
181. Id. at 425.
182. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966) ("[A] major purpose
of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs. This
of course includes discussions of candidates, structures and forms of government,
the manner in which government is operated or should be operated, and all such
matters relating to political processes."); Piscottano v. Town of Somers, 396
F.Supp.2d 187, 200 (D. Conn. 2005) ("The First Amendment's protection of free
speech . . . extends to a broad range of speech and expressive conduct ... . Speech
on public issues and political matters lies at the heart of protected speech.").
183. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425; Terri Day, Speak No Evil: Legal Ethics v.
The First Amendment, 32 J. LEGAL PROF. 161, 187-89 (2008) (discussing the
Garcetti opinion and its counterintuitive result from a First Amendment perspective
in that it restricts the public's access to information essential to self-governance from
those most knowledgeable about governmental performance).
184. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 420 (holding that public employees' employment
grievances are not constitutionally protected speech).
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deciding factor is whether the public employee is speaking "pursuant to
employment responsibilities" specifically or to general matters pertaining
to his or her government employer.185
Making such fine distinctions between permissible and
impermissible speech for public employees in open comment sessions
can be too difficult for public officials not schooled in the nuances of the
employee-speech doctrine. A public employer can avoid such difficulties
by creating policies and procedures which provide the opportunity for
public employees to air both specific and general employment-related
grievances.186 "Giving employees an internal forum for their speech will
discourage them from concluding that the safest avenue of expression is
to state their views in public."18
When, however, a citizen wishes to publicly comment on the
public entity's employees or employment-related decisions, the
employee speech doctrine does not apply. 1 The government-as-
employer concerns about discipline in the workforce and controlling the
message of government policy are not implicated.'8 Thus, citizens'
complaints against public employees are usually permissible in open
comment sessions, so long as the topic is not inconsistent with other
legitimate, content-neutral, time, place, and manner restrictions.190
Speech about the qualifications and performance of public
employees and the employment-related decisions of public officials lies
185. Id. at 424 ("When a public employee speaks pursuant to employment
responsibilities, however, there is no relevant analogue to speech by citizens who are
not government employees."). But see Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563
(1968) (holding that a teacher who wrote a letter to a local newspaper criticizing the
school board's handling of particular fiscal matters was speaking as a private citizen
on a matter of public concern; a position necessitating that his speech be protected
by the First Amendment).
186. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424 (discussing the different means a government
employer can use to avoid a situation in which employees make their grievances
known publicly).
187. Id. ("A public employer that wishes to encourage its employees to voice
concerns privately retains the option of instituting internal policies and procedures
that are receptive to employee criticism.").
188. See id. at 417.
189. Id. at 419.
190. Leventhal v. Vista United Sch. Dist., 973 F. Supp. 951 (S.D. Cal. 1997)
(finding that a citizen's right to criticize public employees in open comment sessions
is protected by the First Amendment).
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at the heart of the First Amendment.191 Such speech would receive the
highest level of protection in a public comment session, characterized as
a "limited" designated public forum. 192 However, other concerns surface
when employment related matters are raised by citizens in public
comment sessions. These types of discussions open the door. to
defamation and privacy concerns. 19 3 Trying to protect reputational and
privacy interests of government employees when these matters are raised
in open comment sessions are usually insufficient reasons to silence a
concerned citizen.194
C. Protecting Reputational and Privacy Interests
In many jurisdictions, rules governing public comment sessions
restrict discussion of personnel matters,195 including citizens' complaints
against individual employees.196 Courts have found that silencing
citizens' criticism of public employees, particularly in the setting of
191. Id. at 958 (reviewing constitutionality of bylaws provisions relating to a
complaint or charge against a public employee in open public meetings).
192. Id. at 957 (noting that the same standards apply to a limited public forum
as applied in a traditional public forum).
193. Id. at 958 (discussing the potential for privacy invasions that can stem
from open public comment sessions).
194. See id (noting that First Amendment guarantees trump comment session
bylaws).
195. See, e.g., Fairchild v. Liberty Indep. Sch. Dst., 597 F.3d 747, 757 (5th
Cir. 2010) (addressing rules governing public comment sessions prohibit discussion
of personnel matters, such as "the appointment, employment, evaluation,
reassignment, duties, discipline or dismissal of a public ... employee") (quoting the
Record of the case); Leventhal, 973 F.Supp. at 953-54 (discussing rules prohibiting
complaints against individual employees of the school district unless employees
consented to discussion in public comment session); Moore v. Asbury Park Bd. of
Educ., No. 05-2971 (ML), 2005 WL 2033687, at *13 (D. N.J. Aug. 23, 2005)
(finding that a prohibition on personally directed comments is an impermissible
viewpoint-based restraint and is unconstitutional).
196. See, e.g., Baca v. Moreno Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 936 F.Supp. 719,
726 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (involving a parent who was ejected from a school board
meeting for criticizing a principal and superintendent, referenced by names and
positions, in violation of school board policy).
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school board meetings, violates the First Amendment.'9 As one court
has stated:
[L]imitation on public criticism [of public
employees] is of particular concern in this case,
arising as it does in the context of public education.
The public entrusts school boards with the
education of its children, and the schools play a
critical role in the social, ethical, and civic
development of those students. To relegate
discussion on the education of a community's
children to closed, back-room sessions would
deprive the public of the most appropriate forum to
debate these issues.198
Public entities have offered the following justifications for
restricting public criticism of their employees: protecting privacy and
property interestsl9 and avoiding reputational harm.200 However, these
proffered justifications are not sufficient to silence "the expressive rights
of the public." 2 0 1 Whether applying strict scrutiny or a lower standard of
review, courts have held that the "no public criticism of employees" rules
are unconstitutional.2 2
In several open meetings, the board president chastised citizens
who raised their concerns about a district superintendent's qualifications
203
and job performance. In Leventhal, the board president invoked the
197. Id.; Bach v. Sch. Bd. of Va. Beach, 139 F.Supp.2d 738, 741 (E.D. Va.
2001) (quoting Va. Beach Sch. Bd. Bylaw 1-48(B)(2)) (holding a school board
bylaw prohibiting "attacks or accusations regarding the honesty, character, integrity
or other like personal attributes of any identified individual or group[]" could not
prohibit plaintiff from stating his concerns about the qualifications, performance and
conduct of school officials in open comment session; however, prohibition on
comments regarding pending student discipline or employee grievance matters were
considered as fine).
198. Leventhal, 973 F.Supp. at 960-61.
199. See id. at 958.
200. Baca, 936 F.Supp. at 727-28.
201. Leventhal, 973 F.Supp. at 959.
202. Id. at 960 (holding the rule prohibiting complaints against individual
employees in open board meetings fails under strict scrutiny and the more deferential
standard of review applied to speech restrictions in nonpublic forums).
203. Id. at 954.
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proscriptions of a bylaw that prohibited discussion of personnel matters
in open meetings unless the affected employee consented.204 Addressing
a challenge to the specific provision, the court recognized that any
interest in protecting employees' right to privacy applied to the district
205only in its role as an employer, not as a government entity. In
providing a forum for citizens' concerns about employees, the district
was fulfilling its statutory obligations as a government entity, not an
206
employer.
Receiving citizens' critical comments did not require the
government entity to "endorse, sanction, or act upon those comments at
the open meeting." 20 7 Any deliberations and actions the board takes in its
role as employer affecting individual employment decisions will occur in
closed sessions.208 Therefore, "the public's statements cannot, as a matter
of law, give rise to an insulted employees' claim for defamation or
deprivation of due process." 20 9
In its opinion, the court assumed the public comment session
was a "limited" public forum, but applied the level of scrutiny applicable
210
to traditional public forums2. Characterizing the no criticism rule as
204. Id. at 953-54 (stating that although state law creates an open forum for
citizens to address items of interest within the board's subject matter jurisdiction,
complaints or charges against employees are prohibited unless the affected employee
consents).
205. Id. at 959 (quoting Baca, 936 F. Supp. at 732) ("'[The District's] interest
in protecting its employees' right to privacy is an interest it holds only as an
employer, not as a government entity, e.g., a legislative body charged with




209. Id. (quoting Baca, 936 F.Supp. at 733) ("'[O]ne who is not the
employees' employer cannot directly deprive the employee of due process."').
210. Id. at 957. The court relied upon City of Madison Joint School District
No. 8 v. Wis. Employment Relations Commission, 429 U.S. 167 (1976), for the
proposition that school board meetings are "'a designated public forum unlimited as
to speakers but not as to topic."' Id. (quoting Clark v. Burleigh, 841 P.2d 975, 985
(Cal. 1992)). Thus, this court categorized public comment sessions at open school
board meetings as limited public forums, but applied the same standard of review as
applicable to traditional public forums. Id. In dicta, the court recognized that Ninth
Circuit precedent did not apply the Madison forum analysis to city board meetings.
Id. (citing Kindt v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 67 F.3d 266, 270 (9th Cir.
1995)) (stating that the nature of "city council and city board meetings 'fit more
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content-based, the court applied strict scrutiny review and held that the
school board's asserted interests to support the rule were not sufficiently
211compelling to justify the speech restriction.
Alternatively, the court applied the more deferential standard of
review applicable to nonpublic forums; and even under the less exacting
212
standard, the no criticism rule violated the First Amendment. Although
content-based speech restrictions are permissible in nonpublic forums,
213those restrictions must be viewpoint neutral. In any forum, government
214
cannot restrict private speech because it disfavors the speaker's views.
When government silences particular views, government censorship is
215most egregious and always offends the First Amendment.
The challenged bylaw in Leventhal prohibited critical comments
of employees, but permitted praise for and laudatory comments about
neatly into the nonpublic forum niche'(quoting Kindt, 67 F.3d at 270)). The court
appeared to find precedent for distinguishing school boards from other public
entities for purposes of public forum analysis. Id. The court's reasoning is flawed for
two reasons: first, the court's strong reliance on Madison for the proposition that
"the Supreme Court has never wavered from its characterization of school boards as
limited public fora," is questionable. Id.; see Ridley v. Mass. Transp. Auth., 390
F.3d 65, 76 n.4 (1st Cir. 2004) ("The phrase 'limited public forum' has been used in
different ways."). Second, while there may be specific state statutes treating citizen
participation in open meetings of school boards different than for meetings of other
governmental entities, case law generally does not make a distinction between
school boards and other governmental entities for purposes of forum analysis. See
supra Part II. However, the unique impact that educators and school board
administrators have on a community's children may demand more community input
at open meetings, while the ballot box provides sufficient community input in other
government arenas, lessening the need for public discourse in open meetings. See
Baca 936 F.Supp. 719, 727-28.
211. Leventhal, 973 F.Supp. at 959-60.
212. Id. at 960.
213. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806
(1985).
214. The First Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor certain subjects
or viewpoints. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803,
813 (2000). Prohibited, too, are restrictions distinguishing among different speakers,
allowing speech by some but not others. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978).
215. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
829 (2000) ("When the government targets not subject matter, but particular views




employees. In favoring positive comments, the rule constituted classic
viewpoint-based discrimination.217 It silenced one view, but not all views
about employees' performance and fitness.2 Consequently, the bylaw
219
violated the First Amendment under any standard of review.
In another case involving a similar bylaw, a citizen complained
about a principal and superintendent in an open comment session.220 The
speaker in Baca v. Moreno Valley Unified School District ignored
warnings to refrain from mentioning either employee by name or by
221
position, resulting in her ejection from the meeting. A lawsuit
followed, alleging that the bylaw was unconstitutional.222 In its ruling,
the court held that: (1) the restriction on criticizing district employees
violated the First Amendment; (2) the open comment session was "a
designated and limited public forum"; (3) the challenged bylaw was
subject to the same standard of review as applied to speech restrictions in
traditional public forums; and (4) the bylaw was a content-based
restriction, not narrowly tailored to serve compelling government
interests.223
Defending its bylaw and its removal of plaintiff from the open
meeting, the school district argued that plaintiffs speech "regarding
child abusers and racists" was slander and a "false light utterance" not
224 225
protected by the First Amendment. The court disagreed. While the
government may restrict defamatory content, it may not restrict only
defamation critical of the government.226 The challenged bylaw
216. Leventhal, 973 F.Supp. at 960.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 960-61 (noting that the court does not address whether the district
could limit complaints about non-policymaking employees, such as teachers,
custodians, cafeteria workers, alleging violations of the law or school policies).
219. Id.
220. Baca v. Moreno Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 936 F.Supp. 719, 726 (C.D.
Cal. 1996).
221. Id
222. Id. at 724-25.
223. Id at 726-27.
224. Id. at 727.
225. Id
226. Id at 728 n.5 (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 384 (1992)
(reversing a conviction under a bias-motivated crime ordinance for burning a cross
on a black family's yard and suggesting that, while fighting words are not protected,
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"proscribes only speech critical of District employees, not speech critical
of anyone else, and does not proscribe only defamatory criticism.',227
Like the district's concern for reputational harm, the interest in
protecting its employees' privacy was equally unprevailing. 228 Similar to
the decision in Leventhal,229 the Baca court distinguished between the
district's roles as an employer from that as a government entity.230 In its
role as an employer, protecting employee privacy is not a compelling
government interest.21 Further, in discussing the tort of invasion of
privacy, the court emphasized that liability cannot be based on disclosing
232
already publicly known private facts. According to the court, the ban
on discussing complaints against employees in open comment sessions is
over-inclusive because it "forbids public disclosure of any criticism,"
even if the criticism would not satisfy the elements of the privacy tort.233
In addition to defamation and privacy, the district argued that its
bylaw served the compelling interest of protecting its employees' liberty
*234
interests. Unsure what the district was arguing, the court recognized
that, in this case, the constitutionally protected liberty interest could only
be violated if employees suffered adverse government action without due
the government may not make a further content discrimination of punishing only
certain kinds of fighting words)).
227. Id. at 728 (discussing that even if the bylaw proscribed only defamatory
speech, it would still be unconstitutional because the government cannot restrict
allegedly defamatory speech without a judicial determination that the speech is
actually harmful). The court also indicated that the bylaw allows the presiding
official to determine what is "slanderous" or "false." Id. at 728 n.6.
228. Id. at 732-33.
229. Leventhal v. Vista United Sch. Dist., 973 F. Supp. 951, 951 (S.D. Cal.
1997).
230. Baca, 936 F. Supp. at 732.
231. Id. (citing Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673 (1994) (ruling that the
government's interest as a sovereign is different from its interests and mission as an
employer)). The court applied strict scrutiny because of the nature of the forum and
its determination that the bylaw was a content-based restriction. Id. at 730. Under
strict scrutiny review, the district must show that the bylaw is necessary to serve a
compelling government interest. Id.
232. Id. at 732-33.




process. Since any adverse employment action would occur in a
closed meeting only after an employee had notice and an opportunity to
be heard, the district's concern about protecting employees' liberty
236interests was without merit.
Even more than the "generic" no personal attack prohibitions,
the ban on complaints against employees in open meetings is doomed to
fail a constitutional challenge. Both are content-based speech restrictions,
which are permissible in some forums, but the further content
discrimination of proscribing complaints against employees is always
237constitutionally impermissible. Protecting employees from reputational
harm or invasions of privacy are not sufficient interests to justify a
speech restriction that discriminates based on both content and
viewpoint.
As Part IV of this article illustrates, there are constitutional
"landmines" that must be avoided when government entities adopt and
238
implement rules of decorum. Effective and constitutionally valid rules
must be neutral and generally applicable to all speakers, clear and
concise, yet specific enough to inform public officials and citizens what
is and is not permissible expressive conduct in public meetings, and
easily enforceable.
V. GUIDELINES FOR ADOPTING AND IMPLEMENTING RULES OF
DECORUM
While common sense can help public officials and citizens to
maintain civility in open comment sessions, properly implementing rules
of decorum cannot rest on common sense alone. What seems
235. Id. ("[O]nly the government . . . can provide the employee with due
process [notice and a right to be heard] related to the government's threatened
stigmatizing action.").
236. Id.
237. Viewpoint based discrimination is presumptively unconstitutional. See
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (holding that bias motivated crime
ordinance for burning cross inside yard of black family is unconstitutional).
238. See infra Part IV.
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commonsensical may offend constitutional principles.239 It is costly for
government entities to defend lawsuits brought by citizens alleging their
First Amendment rights were violated when public officials silenced
240their voice or ejected them from public meetings.
Despite constitutional complexities, a code of conduct should
incorporate some basic principles. Foremost, whichever forum rules a
jurisdiction has adopted, government entities must adopt civility rules
that are viewpoint neutral. Government entities may constitutionally
limit discussion topics and groups consistent with their subject matter
jurisdiction, but, beyond this, rules should be content neutral. Rules that
limit citizen comments should address the time, place, and manner of the
comments. For instance, government entities may impose time limits on
citizens' comments. The open comment session of public meetings may
be scheduled at the beginning or end of meetings. Placards, signs, and
visual aids may be barred from public meetings and comment sessions.
Depending on the type of forum created, comments may be limited to
agenda items. Citizens may be required to request speaking time prior to
the meeting and list the topic of their planned comments, so long as the
review process is timely and impartial to subject matter and identity of
the speaker.
All codes of conduct should include rules of procedure for
cutting off disruptive comments. For example, rules of procedure may
require a presiding official to inform a speaker of his non-compliance, to
warn a speaker of possible consequences for non-compliance, and to
request voluntary compliance before taking more punitive measures,
such as ejection from the meeting or arrest for disrupting a public
meeting. Rules can restrict comments that are irrelevant, repetitive, and
harassing. However, public officials must take care to apply these rules
according to the governing procedures and in a consistent, non-arbitrary
manner.
239. While it may seem commonsensical to not make offensive comments to
people, the First Amendment protects offensive speech. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps,
U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
240. MALDEF: Missouri Town Releases Informaiton on Litigation Costs
(Nov. 24, 2008), http://www.maldef.org/truthinimmigration/missouri town_
releases information onl 1242008/index.html (stating that one suit in which the city
defended an oridinance cost more than $115,000.00).
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Some topics are inappropriate for discussion in comment
sessions and may be restricted. Specifically, public employees do not
have a constitutional right to air their employment grievances in open
meetings. 24 ' The law is less clear about the right of public employees to
raise general complaints about their government employer in open
meetings. To avoid the fine line-drawing between employees' "official"
speech and employees' speech as a private citizen on matters of public
concern, the government employer should provide public employees
administrative processes for airing specific and general employment-
related grievances. This provides public employees alternative channels
of communication, and public entities could require their employees to
pursue and to exhaust administrative procedures before airing grievances
in open meetings.
As to citizens' employee-related grievances, public officials
should respect citizens' rights to publicly question and criticize the
fitness and job performance of public employees. However, private
complaints, unrelated to job performance, are not appropriate discussion
for open comment sessions. Public officials should not respond to
citizens' criticisms of employees in open meetings. Furthermore, the
rules should require that no deliberations or actions affecting
employment conditions of public employees shall occur in open
meetings without the consent of the affected employee.
In the heat of public debate, it can be difficult for public officials
to apply neutral rules of general applicability in a consistent, non-
arbitrary manner. Perfectly drafted rules of decorum can be
impermissibly applied if public officials are selective in their
enforcement. Training is a key component to ensure that rules of
decorum serve their dual purpose of protecting citizens' rights to
participate in public meetings and furthering the efficient
242
accomplishment of government business. Training also serves a third
purpose, which is to protect public officials and public entities from
lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of rules of decorum and their
application.
241. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410,418 (2006).
242. Both Maryland and Texas already require training for public officials. See
MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T. § 10-502.4(d), (2009); Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JC-
0169 (2000), https://oag.state.tx.us/opinions/49cornyn/op/2000/htm/jcO 1 69.htm.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Public debate on public issues is a prized American privilege.243
While the Constitution does not guarantee citizens the right to participate
in public meetings, those rights can be created by state statute or judicial
244fiat. Once citizens are granted expressive rights in public meetings,
those rights fall under the protective umbrella of the First Amendment.
Government entities required to open their meetings to public
comment are challenged with adopting and implementing rules of
decorum. On the surface, such rules would seem fairly basic. At its core,
civility is "play nice in the sandbox;" a concept drilled into the psyches
of most people from earliest memories. However, one only has to read
the headlines, watch TV news, or log on to YouTube to recognize that
too many acts of violence are the result of citizens-gone-mad and no
amount of civility rules will impact the reality of such tragedies. Without
belaboring the obvious, the effectiveness of rules of decorum depends
upon "uncontrollable" and "unknowable" factors, such as an individual's
emotional stability and tolerance for conflict. The most well drafted and
perfectly implemented set of rules cannot account for the "human"
factor.
However, even level-headed, responsible citizens can become
disruptive when confronting official policymakers whose decisions affect
the most precious aspects of everyday lives: children's education, jobs,
property values, and economic welfare. Officials presiding over public
comment sessions must determine when citizens' participation becomes
disruptive and how to contain the disruption. In deciding when and how
to cut-off disruptive citizens, public officials must balance the rights of
citizens to participate in open meetings with the need to efficiently
accomplish government business. Finally, First Amendment principles
243. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966) ("[A] major purpose
of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs. This
of course includes discussions of candidates, structures and forms of government,
the manner in which government is operated or should be operated, and all such
matters relating to political processes."); Piscottano v. Town of Somers, 396
F.Supp.2d 187, 200 (D.Conn. 2005) ("The First Amendment's protection of free
speech . . . extends to a broad range of speech" and expressive conduct. "Speech on
public issues and political matters lies at the heart of protected speech.").
244. See supra Part Ill.
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dictate what actions taken by presiding officials are constitutionally
241
permissible and impermissible.
While meeting all of the above considerations, government
entities must adopt and implement rules of decorum to guide public
officials tasked with the responsibility of presiding over open meetings
and public participation sessions. As discussed above, it is a difficult task
even for the courts to unravel the constitutional complexities that arise
when citizens challenge the application of these rules of decorum. If
courts struggle, it is inevitable that public officials, unschooled in the
nuances of First Amendment jurisprudence, would have difficulties
knowing when and how to apply civility rules in a way that cuts off
disruptive citizens and, at the same time, does not trample on their First
Amendment rights.
Public officials must respect the First Amendment rights of
citizens to participate in public meetings and conduct government
business in an orderly and efficient manner. Well-drafted rules of
decorum, without proper training, will be ineffective tools to guide
public officials. Public officials, like citizens, are not immune from the
passions that are stirred in public debate. It is "human" to get defensive
when receiving angry citizens' complaints. Rules of decorum, along with
training, can provide public officials an effective shield to perform their
public responsibilities within the constitutional parameters of the First
Amendment.
Civility in public debate is somewhat of an oxymoron. It is
expected that public debate will be uninhibited, robust, wide-open,
vehement, caustic, and sharp. Such speech is not only protected, it is
encouraged. The First Amendment embodies the right of Americans to
express their views in political discourse, even if not always in good taste
or according to dictates of civility.
245. Whatever actions public officials take to stop disruptive comments in
public meetings, those actions must be consistent with the First Amendment. See
Norse v. City of Santa Cruz, 586 F.3d 697 (2009) (stating that the public official
might not like that a citizen made a Nazi salute, but a Nazi salute is protected by the
First Amendment unless it disrupts the public meeting).
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